Somalia, 20 years staring out of the Abyss
This paper does not represent the views of the US government, blah, blah, blah…
‘I think the biggest challenge for Somalia has been the sense that it is a hopeless case of incomprehensible internal conflicts and there is nothing we can do.’ - Jan Egeland, United Nations Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief 2003 to 2006.
Somalia is the textbook example of a perpetual failed state. The United States should proceed carefully in implementing a new National Security Strategy for this country.
History
The current area of Somalia was created out of two European colonies, Italy and Great Britain. In 1960 Great Britain imposed a central, nominally western democratic government with a prime minister and a legislature. The prime minister was assassinated in 1969 and Major General Muhammad Siad Barre came to power in a bloodless coup. Barre ruled until Somalia collapsed into civil war in 1990.
In 1991, Operation Restore Hope saw a U.S. Task force and a UN Peacekeeping force enter Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu to try to restore order . After the ‘Blackhawk down’ incident, the US withdrew troops from Somalia in 1993. Other than some minor operations conducted by Special Operations Forces (SOF) targeting suspected terrorists, there has been little direct US involvement in the intervening years. The United Nations removed its mission in 1995.
In 2000, an internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed from the group of warlords who had previously ruled Somalia. In response, a coalition of Islamic Shari’a courts, Islamic Courts Union opposed the interim government and gained control of the southern region of the country in 2006. Al-Shabaab, a fundamentalist terrorist group was formed by some dissidents within the ICU in 2004, also opposing the interim TFG. The US government believes Al-Shabaab has links to al-Qaeda, although these links are tenuous . Links of Al-Shabaab to other extremist groups in various parts of the world are better established.
In 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia under pressure from the US and the African Union to support the transitional government and defeat the terrorist resistance. Ethiopia withdrew from Somalia in 2008 turning over responsibility to African Union troops.
Current situation
Somalia, like much of the Horn of Africa is suffering from significant famine. Hundreds of thousands of refugees occupy a camp in Kenya. Somali pirates prey upon merchant shipping off the Somali coast which has impacted the cost of transport and has forced several nations to start patrolling waters of the coast of Somalia to deter these actions. The ransoms are large and are usually paid by the shipping line insurance company and delivered via airdrop. The TFG remains in power, although they are weak and control only about 60 percent of Mogadishu . The rest of Somalia is controlled by Al-Shabaab and other groups including some semi-autonomous states.
African Union troops are working in Mogadishu to expand the authority and power of the TFG. Ethiopia and Kenya continue to have some troops on the ground in Somalia targeting terrorist influences that have bedeviled their own countries. Both currently work outside the auspices of the AU and AU forces.
Recommended Actions
Support and help expand the transitional government. The TFG is weak and lacks influence. One of the reasons for the dearth of support across Somalia for the TFG is a lack of focus on the most central institutions in Somalia, the clan or local tribe. If these long standing informal institutions aren’t somehow integrated into the central government, or perhaps into a loose confederation of tribes, it will continue to lack popular support. The TFG should be funded and trained to approach the challenge of governance with a bottom-up approach vice the current top-down.
Some areas of Somalia operate in nearly autonomous modes and Somaliland, which makes up the north-west third of the country actually considers itself a sovereign nation. The US should work through the United Nations to advise the TFG on strategies that will ensure inclusion of all Somalis and acknowledge the importance of clan to the process of governance. A focus on local governance with an eye to a loose confederation of states might make the most sense for the Somali people. In the end, the type of government instituted in Somalia must be one instituted with the approval of the Somali people that provides them with the type of governance they desire. There may be important lessons to be learned from Somaliland and the other semi-autonomous areas that can inform a more permanent Somali central government.
Enhance AU Troops: African Union troops have seen some modest successes in Mogadishu in recent weeks. The US should build on these successes with further assistance. AU peacekeepers receive training through a small company contracted by State Department and the UN . These efforts have seen real results. ‘When the AU arrived in 2008, there were dozens of bomb attacks. Nearly 100 soldiers died in such attacks in that first year, and around 20 in the second. The AU hasn’t lost a soldier to a roadside bomb in over a year. ’ The AU troops arrived untrained and poorly equipped. The UN/US training has paid dividends. The AU troops have changed their operations from long range shelling of Al-Shabaab positions (with significant civilian deaths) to foot patrols to weed out the insurgents.
The United States should work with the governments of Kenya and Ethiopia to convince them to place any forces they bring in country under the umbrella of the African Union. The importance of using African troops under the African Union for these efforts is critical. African Union control will help to downplay the influence by Ethiopia, which was viewed by many in Somalia during Ethiopia’s occupation as an attempt to ‘Christianize’ the country by the nominally Christian Ethiopia. By providing equipment, aid and training to the African Union troops, the United States can positively impact this fledgling effort to bring stability to the country. As an example, the United States is transporting approximately 1,200 military vehicles per month from Afghanistan to the United States. A small portion of these could be diverted to Somalia to provide the AU with greater capability and flexibility and potentially be used to deliver aid in those areas where order has been restored. Similarly, other excess equipment from US endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan could be provided to the AU troops to dramatically improve their capability and capacity.
Dramatically increase food aid. The United States should work with partner nations to provide significant amounts of aid, especially to Al Shabaab controlled areas. Use of strategic communications during these deliveries (leaflets, etc.) could highlight the fact that Al Shabaab has cut off aid to those most in need . This information combined with the desperately needed aid could have a dramatic effect on Al Shabaab’s power base. Food and other required supplies could be delivered by airdrop in Al-Shabaab controlled areas and delivered by the AU in those areas where AU troops have made significant progress. These acts could go a long way toward convincing Sub-Saharan African nations that the world and the US is serious about their plight and wants to help relieve the famine.
Expand aid to Somali agriculture. Meat from livestock is a significant part of Somalia’s current informal economy. Working with the United Nations various groups such as the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other organizations, Somalia could be provided with technological improvements and veterinary care to improve their livestock and food production. The WTO could work to improve access to Middle Eastern markets for this livestock providing greater trade opportunities to Somalia. As governance improves, the United States should move quickly to target goods and/or services that Somalis could provide to the United States to help improve the standard of living in Somalia.
Help Fund Somali Coast Guard. The TFG is very interested in solving the pirate issue with a Somali Coast Guard. The current Coast Guard units are woefully underfunded and undermanned. A recent meeting in Turkey laid out a plan for Somalia to purchase two search and rescue boats and six coast guard boats at a cost of 250 million euros . These required ships and potentially more should be provided by the United States and other members of the United Nations through donations. In addition to anti-piracy operations, this properly outfitted coast guard could help Somalia enforce proper fishing of its economic exclusion zone (EEZ) providing food and jobs to the Somali economy while protecting a vital resource.
Target Piracy Operations Ashore. As the issue of improved governance and food delivery begin to have an effect, the issue of piracy must be addressed. Developing a capable Somali Coast Guard is a good long term goal, but in the short term, pirate bases along the Somali coast should be targeted for destruction. The United Nations has previously approved the use of force to target these pirate camps (UN Security Council resolution 9541, 16 December 2008). To date, only a few pirates have been captured and the process of bringing them to justice has proven difficult with few countries willing to tackle the legal challenges of crimes committed on the high seas. By targeting the areas that provide direct support to the pirates and benefit from the largesse of Lloyds of London’s extortion payments, support for these endeavors should wane.
Wrap-up
Somalia’s problems are significant and the scale of need is enormous. Establishing good governance from the ground up is critical before lasting change can occur. Expanding the efforts of the African Union force to help the TFG gain influence through larger portions of the country will help enable a central government that is able to enforce a rule of law. Immediate delivery of desperately needed aid combined with longer range strategy to address Somalia’s agriculture economy will alleviate current suffering and improve the country’s ability to feed itself and enhance trade in the future years. A mid to long term plan to provide a trained and equipped coast guard combined with current strikes on pirate bases will minimize the current destabilizing impact of pirates on world commerce with a view toward providing the ability for Somalia to control their waters and the critical natural resource from the seas. With these plans in place, Somalia can begin to build itself into a sovereign nation able to interact in a positive way with the rest of the world.
Bibliography
Allard, K. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1995.
Bila, Sibel Utkau, Hurriyet Daily News. ‘Starving Somalia asks for coast guard ships,’ archive.hurriyetdailynews.com
Buss, Terry, ‘Al-Qaeda in Africa – The Threat and Response’ African Security and African Command: Viewpoints on the US Role in Africa (2011): 195.
France 24 ‘Aid agencies barred from al Shabaab-controlled areas,’
france24.com
Houreld, Katharine, ABC News. ‘US Group Trains Troops in Somalia,’.
abcnews.go.com
Le Sage, Andre. ‘Somalia’s Endless Transition : Breaking the Deadlock.’ Strategic Forum. No 257 (2010): 1-8.
Sahnoun, M. Somalia The Missed Opportunities. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994